



#### **BiLock: User Authentication via Dental Occlusion Biometrics**

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#### PART 1: Motivation

PART 2: Feasibility

PART 3: System

PART 4: Evaluation

### **1.1: User Authentication**



Small form-factor wearables are increasingly POPULAR among people



#### **Data privacy** issue should be seriously treated for these smart devices

## **1.2: Existing methods**



Fingerprint



Iris recognition



**Face recognition** 



**Breath-printing** 



**Voice-printing** 



Gait recognition



**Gesture recognition** 



**Brain wave** 

### **1.3: Their limitations**

Hardware concern: sensor size, energy consumption (*Face/Iris/Finger*)

**Social acceptance**: feeling embarrassing in public (*Voice*)

Stability: affected by user's physiologic states (*Breathing/Voice/gait*)

Security: not robust enough to different kinds of attacks (Voice)

2

3

4

## 1.4: Our proposal



#### Sounds of tooth click as a biometric for smart devices authentication

Hardware : pervasive microphone, no additional sensor
Social acceptance: more imperceptible and unobtrusive to others
Stability: not easily affected by body states
Security: robust against replay and observation attacks

### Outline



PART 2: Feasibility

PART 3: System

PART 4: Evaluation

#### 2.1: Clinic observation





# **Shape**, **Size**, **Orientation** and **Mass** of teeth are different among different people\*

\*Thomas R Katona and George J Eckert. 2017. The mechanics of dental occlusion and disclusion. Clinical Biomechanics 50 (2017), 84–91.

### 2.2: Feasibility study

#### Hardware

Devices	Class
Samsung Galaxy Tab S2	SM-T815C
Huawei Watch 2	LEO-DLXX
Decibel-meter	AS804
Computer	Hp:498 G3MT
MatLab	2016a

#### Environment



#### **Data collection**

- Settings: meeting room (N<sub>1</sub>: 30~40 dB, N<sub>2</sub>: 40~50 dB, N<sub>3</sub>: 50~60 dB, N<sub>4</sub>: 60~70 dB), lab room (40~50 dB)
- Sessions:  $S_1$  (1~2 days, 20 samples),  $S_2$  (3~4 days, 20 samples),  $S_3$  (2~3 weeks, 20 samples),  $S_4$  (1~2 month, 20 samples),  $S_5$  (3~4 months, 10 samples),  $S_6$  (5~6 months, 10 samples)
- Data: 100 (number of instances)  $\times 5$  (number of settings)  $\times 50$  (number of participants)  $\times 2$  (number of devices)

### 2.3: Study results



#### The PSD curve of user X at different time intervals PSD correlation of user X at different time



*Conclusion:* 

**(1)** *Consistent* for the same person

**2** *Different* for different persons

The PSD curve of user Y at different time intervals PSD correlation between user X and user Y

### Outline



PART 2: Feasibility

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#### 3.1: System architecture



**Challenge 1:** how to detect tooth click events adaptively in different environments?

**Challenge 2:** how to design authentication model to accurately authenticate users?

#### 3.2: Event detection



#### 3.3: Feature extraction

MFCC



The average feature vector of user Y in different sessions



The feature vector correlation coefficients of user X



The feature correlation coefficients of user X and user Y

### 3.3: Model training



### 3.3: Model evolution



#### 3.3: Model adaptation



Select samples deviate with previous samples, considering the variation of tooth click in the long term:

**Kullback-Leibler (KL)** 
$$KL(\Delta t) = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \overline{MFCC_i}^t \log \frac{\overline{MFCC_i}^t}{MFCC_i^{t+\Delta t}}$$



S<sub>6</sub>

### Outline

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### 4.1: Accuracy



### 4.2: Robustness

25

FRR

FAR

10

and FAR (%) 10 10

FRR

5

0



Mobility nearly **NOT** affect the performance of BiLock

Works well within a distance of less than **20 cm** 

Impact of distance to user's lips

20

30

Working Distance (cm)

Less than 20 cm

Ξ

40

50

### 4.3: User variance



	Max.	Min.
FAR	6.2%	2.4%
FRR	1.4%	1.1%

# 4.4: Comparison

100

50

0

WeChat

**BiLock** 

20

LockScreen

40



Test WerChat, LockScreen, BiLock under different *noise levels* 

#### **Robustness:**

BiLock is *comparable* with WeChat, and *better* than LockScreen

Test WerChat, LockScreen, BiLock under *replay attacks* 

60

Recording distance (cm)

80

100

**Replay attack:** BiLock performs **obviously better** than other two systems



Test WerChat, LockScreen, BiLock under **observation attacks** 

#### **Observation attack:** BiLock performs **similarly** to other two systems

### 4.5: User experience

#### **100** volunteers, **50** are newly recruited, online questionnaire



- "It is rather embarrassing to speak out words in public when using voiceprinting method. In contrast, BiLock is more imperceptible and easy to use. But I prefer to use BiLock without placing the device so near to my mouth if possible."
- "I use voice-prints frequently but BiLock is also cool. I think BiLock may be more robust when I caught a cold. Sometimes my phone does not recognize my voice when I got sick."



We propose a novel biometric authentication scheme with good ubiquity, high robustness and security based on human tooth clicks

We design methods to extract tooth click events adaptively in different environments, and effective authentication model with self-adaptation

The experimental results show that in the normal noise environment of 50~60 dB, th authentication recognition model achieves FRR less than 5.0%, FAR less than 0.95%.

# THANK YOU



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